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No discipline that aﬀords a central evidential role to an unreliable source is in good standing.
So if analytic philosophy aﬀords a central evidential role to intuitions, then if intuitions
are unreliable, then analytic philosophy is not in good standing.1 So much, I think, is
uncontroversial. Some of the early critiques of traditional analytic methods by experimental
philosophers assumed that analytic philosophy gives intuitions central roles, and, citing data
that suggested that intuitions may be unreliable, argued on these grounds that analytic
philosophy might not be in good standing. For example, in their famous paper alleging
cross-cultural diversity with respect to epistemic intuitions, Weinberg et. al describe their
target thus:
The family of strategies that we want to focus on all accord a central role to what
we call epistemic intuitions. Thus we will call this family of strategies Intuition
Driven Romanticism (or IDR). As we use the notion, an epistemic intuition is
simply a spontaneous judgment about the epistemic properties of some specific
case—a judgment for which the person making the judgment may be able to oﬀer
no plausible justification. To count as an Intuition Driven Romantic strategy
for discovering or testing epistemic norms, the following three conditions must
be satisfied: (i) The strategy must take epistemic intuitions as data or input.
(It can also exploit other sorts of data.). . . Weinberg et al. (2001, p. 432)
In recent years, some defenders of traditional philosophical methodology have argued
that critiques like this one are mistaken in assuming that intuitions play central evidential
roles in traditional philosophical methods. According to this kind of response, experimental
philosophers attack a straw man; it doesn’t matter whether intuitions are reliable, because
philosophers don’t use intuitions in the way assumed. Deutsch (2010), Williamson (2007),
and Cappelen (2012) all defend traditional methods in something like this way. I also
endorsed something like this line in Ichikawa (2014a).
In this contribution, I will follow up on this sort of defence of traditional philosophical
methods in three ways. In §1, I will rehearse and extend some of my reasons for challenging
the idea that traditional methods depend on intuitions in an evidential role. (My reasons
are very diﬀerent from those discussed in (Cappelen, 2012).) I will also engage with some
1Some experimentalist critics of traditional philosophical methods do not charge that intuition is un-
reliable, but that it is epistemically deficient in some weaker way—e.g. the ‘hopelessness’ of Weinberg
(2007).
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recent more sophisticated attempts to establish the idea that intuitions play evidential
roles in philosophy, such as that of Chudnoﬀ (2013). In §2, I will consider and argue
against a dismissive response to such positions from experimental philosophers, who consider
the question of philosophical reliance on intuitions to be irrelevant to the experimentalist
critique. But in §3, I will argue that it would also be a mistake to conclude (as Herman
Cappelen does) that the critique is rendered totally irrelevant by the denial of the evidential
role of intuitions; I defend a more moderate view on which the bearing of experimental
studies of philosophical intuitions is relevant for philosophical methodology, but only in a
relatively limited way.
2 Intuitions and Evidence
What would it be for intuitions to play evidential roles in philosophy? According to a
psychologistic model, propositions of the form I have the intuition that p, typically known
via introspection, play fundamental evidential roles. Jessica Brown (2011) defends such a
model. According to her version of the view, in paradigmatic cases one achieves philosophical
knowledge by beginning with psychological evidence concerning what intuitions one has,
and bases one’s nonpsychological philosophical conclusions on such evidence. Since, Brown
thinks, the psychological episodes that are intuitions are in fact reliable indicators of the
truth of their contents, those contents can end up justified, or even known, on such grounds.2
The psychologistic model is perhaps the clearest instance of a view on which intuitions
play central evidential roles, but it is not the only one. One may also hold that the men-
tal episodes that are intuitions play important evidential roles without themselves being
essential evidence—one might hold, for instance, that intuitions provide their contents as
evidence. In general, the contents of intuitions are not psychological. For example, if I have
the intuition that a statue would cease to exist when smashed, the content of the intuition
is the nonpsychological claim about the statue.
One might hold that intuitions always provide their contents as evidence, but I do not
consider this view plausible; I think there are good reasons to think that (a) some intuitions
have false propositions as contents,3 and (b) false propositions are never among one’s ev-
idence.4 So a more plausible version of the nonpsychologistic view of intuitions is that in
some suitable cases, one possesses a proposition as evidence by virtue of having an intuition
with that proposition as its content. Even still, however, this claim must be interpreted
carefully—in particular, that ‘by virtue of’ must be read in a suitably strong way. Assum-
ing that evidence can be established inferentially, for example, anyone should admit that
there are some possible cases where the intuition that p plays a role in establishing p as
evidence. For example, if one knows antecedently that my intuition about whether p will
2Brown argues (pp. 512–13) that an externalist approach like the reliabilist one described here is
necessary to defend the psychologistic model from skeptical worries. But other defenders of similar models,
such as Chudnoﬀ (2013), develop their views in internalist ways.
3Ludwig (2007) argues that ‘intuition’ is factive; nothing counts as an ‘intuition’ unless it is the successful
exercise of a conceptual competence, which will always issue into truth. This seems to me rather clearly
to be a somewhat revolutionary sense of the term. Peter Singer knows full well that many people have the
intuition that one has special moral obligations to one’s kin; he thinks that intuition is mistaken. Whether
or not his ethical view is correct, he is not contradicting himself by thinking that these are false intuitions.
4Rizzieri (2009) gives dissent; I agree with Unger (1975), Williamson (2000), and Littlejohn (2013) that
evidence cannot be false. I am particularly impressed by this argument, which is related to the discussion
of Williamson (2000, ch. 9): if one could have false evidence, then one’s evidence could entail a false
hypothesis, which would mean that one has conclusive evidence for something false. But by definition, if I
have conclusive evidence for something, it must be true.
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be a correct intuition, then establishing that I have the intuition that p will conclusively
establish p.5 The interesting epistemic claim in the area is the one that there is a stronger
connection between intuition and evidence—for instance, that it is in the nature of intuition
that it provide, at least in central cases, its content as evidence. Or perhaps that there is
a law or a general epistemic principle to the eﬀect that intuitions’ contents count as evi-
dence. It is not enough to establish merely that, combined with some possible background
knowledge, an intuition may provide its content as evidence. (Combined with some possible
background knowledge, anything can be evidence for anything logically compatible with it.)
Benjamin Jarvis and I have called the view that intuitions play such evidential roles
“experientialist rationalism”. We argue that all such views are false.6 Since this question
plays a central role in the question of the relevance of experimental data about intuitions,
it is worthwhile to summarise some of the considerations in favour of this claim here.
The acquisition of evidence in favour of p can play an important role in coming to a
justified belief that p, but it isn’t the only relevant factor. In addition to having the evidence,
a subject must respond appropriately to it. Bruce may have figured out that the thief is
after the diamonds, while Dick still has no idea what’s going to happen next—this, even
though they share all the same evidence. Acquiring the evidence gives one some of what
one needs, but not everything; rational skill dictates how the evidence will be used. Jarvis
and I use the term propositional justification for the state of having suﬃcient evidence to
draw a particular conclusion, whether or not the person has responded to the evidence in
the rational way. A belief that is properly formed on the basis of the relevant evidence is
doxastically justified. The terminological decisions aren’t the important part—the point to
emphasise is that evidence is relevant at that first stage of inquiry. Evidence for p gives
one reason to believe that p, whether or not he or she actually believes it (or indeed, if he
or she does actually believe it, whether or not he or she believes it for a good reason).
With this background in place, we are now in a position to express a central argument
against the idea that intuitions provide evidence in a priori cases. Consider this case, which
I introduced in Ichikawa (2014b, pp. 201–2):
Boris and Natasha . . . are playing chess. Natasha is playing white; it is her
move. The position of the pieces is as given [below]:
Natasha has available a move to win the game; Rh3# (moving her rook to the
far right of the board) places the black king in checkmate. Bullwinkle knows the
rules of chess, but he is nevertheless unaware that Natasha has available a move
to win the game. His ignorance shouldn’t be too surprising, because, it turns
out, he is blindfolded, and can’t see the board. He has no idea where the pieces
are, so of course he doesn’t know that Natasha is in a position to win.
But what happens next is slightly more interesting. Bullwinkle’s blindfold slips
oﬀ, and for the first time, he sees the board and the position of each piece. Now
he knows a lot more about the game. But, let’s suppose, he still doesn’t know
that Natasha is in a position to win. You see, Bullwinkle isn’t a very experienced
chess player, and although he knows where each piece is, and knows all the rules
of chess, he hasn’t noticed that Rh3 would put Boris in checkmate.
The key moment to consider is the one after the blindfold slips. Now Bullwinkle has the
relevant perceptual experiences—he can see the board. Although he still doesn’t know that
5Whether p could thereby be evidence depends on one’s theory of evidence; if Williamson (2000, ch. 9)
is correct, then it certainly could.
6Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013, ch. 11)
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Figure 1: Boris and Natasha’s Game
Natasha can win on this turn, he has conclusive evidence that she can. In the terminology
above, he now has propositional justification for the proposition that Natasha will win,
even though he doesn’t know it, or even believe it, even if he is contemplating the question.
This constitutes a rational shortcoming; by remaining agnostic about that for which he has
conclusive reason to believe, Bullwinkle demonstrates that he is a less than ideally rational
agent. Importantly, Bullwinkle’s position manifests rational failure only after his blindfold
slipped; even an ideal rational agent will be agnostic about whether Natasha can win this
turn, if he can’t see the board. But once the perceptual experiences obtain, Bullwinkle faces
rational pressure towards accepting this conclusion.
It is suﬃcient for this kind of rational pressure that Bullwinkle has the experiences that
justify true beliefs about the state of the game—the rules of chess, the position of the pieces,
that it is Natasha’s turn, and that she is playing white. We do not need to stipulate that
Bullwinkle has an intuition with the content that Natasha can win this turn. One could
consider such a version of the case—perhaps Bullwinkle has enough chess experience to
have developed subpersonal intuitions of this sort, and he’s failing to take advantage of
them in this instance—but it is not necessary to suppose that he has this kind of chess
ability to establish the verdict that he is manifesting rational limitations. This means that
there is rational pressure in this case that does not depend on the presence of intuition.7
And this seems to apply to all rational necessities—the truths of logic and arithmetic, so-
called ‘conceptual truths’, the parts of philosophy people have called ‘analytic’, etc. This
is the my first argument against intuitions in evidential roles—the argument from ‘opaque
7One might wonder, as Jennifer Nado did in personal correspondence, whether it’s necessary for the
kind of rational pressure I’m describing that Bullwinkle could form the intuition under the circumstances.
I make three observations in response. First, even if it were true that Bullwinkle only has propositional
justification if he is capable of forming the relevant intuition, this would not suﬃce to defend experimen-
talist rationalism from the critique; according to experimentalist rationalism, it is something about the
experience of an intuition itself that does justificatory work. (For example, on the view of Chudnoﬀ (2013),
the phenomenology of intuitions plays the relevant role.) Positing a kind of counterfactual intuition as a
necessary condition for propositional justification does not support any central epistemic role for actual
intuitions. Second, in the plausible ways of spelling out this case, there is a straightforward sense in which
Bullwinkle could have the relevant intuition—this is what would happen if he thought a little harder and
more carefully. Third, Jarvis and I argue that the counterfactual necessary condition is false. See Ichikawa
and Jarvis (2013, pp. 282–83). So even if Bullwinkle couldn’t have the intuition, that doesn’t prevent his
situation from constituting a rational failure. Indeed, it is reasonably natural to think that his inability to
have such intuitions contributes, causally or constitutively, to his rational failure.
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irrationality’.8 There is rational pressure in favour of accepting these truths, even if subjects
are unaware of such pressure, and don’t even feel an inclination to adopt it.9
But once we think that in cases like Bullwinkle’s there is rational pressure that does
not depend on intuitions, there seems to be little motivation to suppose that intuitions
are playing central roles in those cases in which they are present.10 I suppose there’s no
contradiction in the idea that, in a counterfactual version of the case where Bullwinkle does
have the intuition, that intuition is playing justificatory roles, but in the version where it
is lacking, something else plays those roles instead. But such a view seems more than a
little ad hoc; I see nothing to recommend it. If the rational pressure is present regardless of
the presence of the intuition, that’s excellent reason to suppose that the intuition doesn’t
explain the rational pressure. Any role intuitions have in cognition, therefore, is quite unlike
the role of perceptual experience. (The counterfactual version of the Bullwinkle story in
which Bullwinkle undergoes no visual experiences of the chessboard is one in which he has
no propositional justification for any particular claims about the state of the game.)
Here is a second, closely related, argument for the same conclusion. Take a subject like
the ones just discussed—someone who fails to believe something for which he has conclusive
reason to believe, and thereby manifests a rational deficiency, even though he has no intuition
that clues him into this fact. Now suppose that over time, his cognitive capacities change.
For example, suppose that Bullwinkle gets better at imagining various possible chess moves,
and recognising important patterns of pieces. Now, if confronted like a board like that above,
Bullwinkle will have the strong intuition, which he’d go on to accept, that white can win
on this move. Such a change constitutes a rational improvement ; if so, the standards of
rationality are not relative to these kinds of intuitions and cognitive abilities, the way they
are relative to perceptual experience.
Elijah Chudnoﬀ (2013) has given the most thorough recent defence of a strong analogy
between intuition and perceptual experience of which I am aware; it is useful to consider the
argument above in the context of his defence of an evidential role for intuitions. Chudnoﬀ
argues for this principle:
(DIJR) If it basically intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have
some prima facie justification for believing that p. (94)
Chudnoﬀ writes that (DIJR) is motivated primarily by reflection on examples:
Take the proposition that every concave figure can be rounded out to a convex
figure that bounds a greater area in a smaller perimeter. This is a good example
because it is likely not something you have thought about before. Initially it
neither seems true nor seems false to you, and you neither have justification for
believing it nor have justification for doubting it. After thinking about it a bit,
however, it should seem true to you. (94)
This ‘seeming true’, Chudnoﬀ thinks, is an intuition experience, and it is what provides
the justification for accepting that conclusion. I recognize something like the phenomenol-
ogy Chudnoﬀ is describing here—initially, at t1, one might have no idea whether a claim
8In previous work, Jarvis and I have called these cases of ‘blind irrationality’.
9Note that to say there is rational pressure here leaves open many normative questions. In particular, it
does not imply that one is criticizable for failing to believe what one has conclusive reason to believe. It also
does not imply that if one does believe what one has such reason to believe, one has formed a doxastically
justified belief. One can believe what one has reason to believe, but do so for the wrong reasons. Thanks
to Michael Johnson for discussion here.
10Thanks to Jennifer Nado for reminding me of the need for this discussion.
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is true, and then at t2, in a flash of insight, one realizes that it must be true. And I also
agree with Chudnoﬀ that at t3, after this experience, one has justification to think that
every concave figure can be rounded out to a convex figure that bounds a greater area in
a smaller perimeter. But I do not agree with Chudnoﬀ that the intuitive experience is the
explanation for this justification. I think that considerations arising from opaque irrational-
ity and rational improvement give us good reason to reject Chudnoﬀ’s claim that one has
no justification at t1. Recall that the relevant notion of justification here is propositional
justification, not doxastic justification.11 It is obvious that I had no doxastic justification at
t1, since doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, and I didn’t have the belief at t1. The
question is whether I had suﬃcient reason at t1 to believe that every concave figure can be
rounded out to a convex figure. In other words, was my ignorance more like Bullwinkle’s
ignorance before his blindfold slipped, or afterwards?
Once the question is thus clarified, it seems to me clear that my failure at t1 is much
more like Bullwinkle’s failure after he gains the relevant sensory experiences. My problem
at t1 isn’t that I am lacking evidence—it’s that I am engaging with the question with less
than fully ideal rationality. I need better reasoning, not better evidence. If so, the intuitive
experience is playing a role very unlike that of perceptual experience in perceptual belief.
It is not providing propositional justification.12
I consider it an open question as to which domains of philosophy have this status. I am
open to the idea that there are some subfields in which psychological elements do occupy
central evidential roles. For example, Regina Rini (2013) argues that moral psychology pro-
ceeds via an abstraction from one’s own moral commitments—the idea is that one engages
in a theoretical process of reflection to determine which of one’s moral commitments are
idiosyncratic, and which more plausibly represent fundamental norms. Rini very sensibly
observes that, given this conception, empirical evidence about the sources of one’s intu-
itions might be very relevant. What I want to insist is that many cases of a priori reasoning
do not rely on such psychological inputs. (I will return in §3 to the question of whether
psychological evidence can be relevant for the evaluation of arguments in these areas.)
So I do agree with the conclusion of Cappelen (2012): it is a mischaracterization of how
philosophical and other a priori reasoning works to suppose that it generally relies in a cen-
tral evidential way on intuitions. (I defend this claim further in Ichikawa (2014a).) In the
remainder of this paper, I will treat this as established, and turn to the question of its impli-
cations for the experimentalist critiques of philosophical methods that are often expressed in
terms of intuitions. My view is intermediate between that defended by Jonathan Weinberg
and Joshua Alexander—that it’s completely irrelevant for this experimentalist project—and
that defended by Herman Cappelen—that it justifies totally ignoring this experimentalist
11I do not think that this is a point of contention between Chudnoﬀ and myself; see e.g. Chudnoﬀ
(2013, p. 85), where he clarifies that the notion of justification at issue in the corresponding claim about
perceptual justification concerns propositional, rather than doxastic, justification. Since his broad project
is to argue that intuitive experience and perceptual experience play similar roles, and since he doesn’t say
otherwise, I assume that Chudnoﬀ’s view is that intuitions establish propositional justification. ( Ichikawa
and Jarvis (2013, p. 298) gives arguments against intuitions’ playing a special role in establishing doxastic
justification.)
12The very natural question of what does provide propositional justification is beyond my present scope.
Ichikawa and Jarvis (2013) argues at length that in cases like this, it is a brute fact that all subjects (or
at least those with the relevant concepts who are considering the question) always have such justification,
regardless of experiences.
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project. I discuss these two extreme views in the next two sections, respectively.
3 Relevance to Experimental Philosophy
Timothy Williamson has also argued, in a series of influential papers, against the assump-
tion that intuitions play important evidential roles in philosophy.13 He suggests that the
reason some philosophers tend to think that philosophical conclusions are based on intuition
derives from an erroneous principle of ‘evidence neutrality’—the idea that for anything to
be evidence for someone, it has to be the sort of thing that all parties to the debate must
recognise as evidence. He argues forcefully against this principle, and suggests on this basis
that, in the kinds of philosophical cases in which one might be tempted to say that an intu-
ition is the ultimate evidence, it is actually the philosophical fact itself that is playing the
evidential role, even though it is a controversial philosophical fact. Williamson’s argument
against intuitions as evidence diﬀers from mine in several important ways; examining some
of the responses to Williamson, and how they bear with respect to my approach, is one way
to bring out these important diﬀerences.
Alexander and Weinberg (2007) give the most direct and explicit response I have seen to
the Williamsonian approach. They write:
Timothy Williamson has also developed a more radical response to the restric-
tionist threat: rejecting the picture of philosophical practice as depending on
intuitions at all! He argues that our evidence [in the relevant cases] is not any
sort of mental seeming, but the facts in the world. He compares philosophical
practice to scientific practice, where we do not take the perceptual seemings of
the scientists as our evidence, but the facts about what they observed. Similarly,
then, we should construe Gettier’s evidence to be not his intellectual seeming
that his case is not an instance of knowledge, but rather the modal fact itself
that such a case is not an instance of knowledge. We retreat from talk of the
world to talk of percepts when we (mistakenly) attempt to accommodate the
skeptic; so, too, do we retreat to talk of intuitions only under the pressure of
skeptical arguments. And since Williamson is himself antiskeptical, emphasizing
the continuity between ordinary modal cognition and philosophical cognition, he
concludes we should give up thinking of our philosophical evidence in the thinly
psychological terms of intuitions.
But we do not think that Williamson’s arguments can provide much solace for
traditional analytic philosophers. For the results of experimental philosophers
are not themselves framed in terms of intuitions, but in terms of the counterfac-
tual judgments of various subjects under various circumstances. Although the
results are often glossed in terms of intuitions to follow standard philosophical
usage, inspection of the experimental materials reveals little talk of intuitions
and mostly the direct evaluation of claims. Alexander and Weinberg (2007, p.
72)
(This is one of two responses they give to Williamson; the other is suggestive of the line
I will press in §3.)
13E.g. (Williamson, 2007, 2004).
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Alexander & Weinberg are giving a version of what Cappelen (2014) calls the ‘X-Phi-
Doesn’t-Need-Intuitions Reply’.14 Although in their presentations of their critiques of arm-
chair methods, experimental philosophers often fall into the language of ‘intuition’ talk,
they are not ultimately relying on any substantive claims about intuitions in important
evidential roles; after all, the experimental data themselves do not typically involve the
word ‘intuition’. For example, although Weinberg et. al’s seminal (2001) makes frequent
use of ‘intuition’ language (including in its title, ‘Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions’),
the application to intuition and to philosophical methodology comes in the interpretation of
their data. Their data concern the correlation between demographic variables and answers
to questions like this one:
One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain be-
comes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the
temperature where he is. Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been
altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe
that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other
reason to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his
room. Does Charles really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he
only believe it? Weinberg et al. (2001, p. 439)
Weinberg et. al observed that students’ answers to this question were correlated with
demographic variables. This by itself does not straightforwardly imply anything about in-
tuition, unless one assumes that answers to questions invariably express intuitions.15 So
in this much, I think it’s clear that Alexander & Weinberg are correct: the data that ex-
perimental philosophers emphasize does not by itself presume any kind of evidential role
for intuition. I do not think, however, that this observation is enough to represent a very
substantial defence of the experimentalist critique. For, just as it requires substantive philo-
sophical interpretation to move from the experimentalists’ data to claims about intuition, so
too does it require substantive philosophical interpretation to move from the data to any kind
of challenge to traditional methodology. It is not an explicit tenet of armchair philosophi-
cal methods that demographic variables are probabilistically independent from judgments
about thought experiments; the experimental results do not directly show a problem. Of
course the experimentalist critics are well aware of this fact, which is why they produce
extensive arguments concerning the interpretation of these results. Unfortunately for these
critics in the present context, many of these arguments do rely heavily and explicitly on
intuition language. In arguing from (a) demographic correlations with thought-experiment
judgments to (b) problems for traditional philosophical methodology, critics often commit to
contentious claims about how philosophers use intuitions. For example, as highlighted in §1,
Weinberg et al. (2001) explicitly target the view they call ‘Intuition-Driven Romanticism’,
which is defined as a view that takes intuitions as substantive input into a process that
yields normative conclusions. Their conclusion—that such views face a serious challenge—
does not bear on any method that does not take intuitions as substantive input; if I am
14Alexander himself may have changed his mind about this; in Alexander (2010, p. 382) he writes that of
the idea that “intuitions neither need nor ought to be treated as evidence in philosophy” that “[i]f true, this
claim would seem to threaten the significance of experimental philosophy.” He goes on to that this claim is
not true, but his argument seems to me to conflate persuasive ability with evidence.
15Indeed, Chudnoﬀ (2013, pp. 109–112) uses this observation to defend an evidential role for intuitions
from experimentalist arguments; Chudnoﬀ (2013) and Alexander and Weinberg (2007) are each defending,
from opposite sides of the divide, a kind of independence between questions about intuitions and questions
about the experimentalist critique of traditional methodology.
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right that traditional armchair philosophical methods on the whole do not use intuitions in
this way, then the conclusion of their paper does not bear on traditional armchair methods.
So even if Alexander and Weinberg are right that experimental philosophy results do not
essentially make use of intuitions, this doesn’t show that their analysis doesn’t.
Experimental philosophy—even the subset that is its negative ‘restrictionist’ program—
is a diverse movement, and we shouldn’t assume that every argument against traditional
methods makes the same assumption. We must consider the arguments one by one. But
it does seem that many experimentalist arguments, at least, do commit to questionable as-
sumptions about intuitions. The argument of the Weinberg et. al paper just mentioned, for
example, carries ineliminable commitments to the psychologistic approach to philosophical
evidence that Williamson challenges in the passage above, and that I challenged in §1. In
Ichikawa (2014a) I argue that quite a lot of the experimentalist critique carries such prob-
lematic commitments. It is worth noting that, contra Ludwig (2007), whether one uses
the word ‘intuition’ is immaterial; the argument that the epistemology does not depend
on intuitions in an evidential role does not turn on verbal questions about how to use the
word ‘intuition’. It just doesn’t matter whether ‘intuition’ is used broadly to refer to all or
most judgments or inclinations to judge, or more narrowly to refer only to judgments with
a special etiology, or accompanying a particular phenomenology. Williamson argues that
no sort of psychological claim is the central evidence; my argument in §1 has the stronger
conclusion that no psychological state is or provides the central evidence. So while I agree
with Alexander and Weinberg that one can express the relevant experimental results with-
out the language of ‘intuitions’, I do not see a clear case that could be made that it’s a
straightforward matter to modify experimentalist arguments to avoid appeal to problematic
assumptions about intuition. This is a point that Cappelen (2014) emphasises—he con-
siders various simple strategies, such as replacing the word ‘intuition’ with ‘philosophical
judgment’ or ‘philosophically relevant judgments about cases’ in presentations of these ar-
guments, and argues that the result is not a compelling argument. I think that, at least with
respect to many cases, Cappelen is right about this. For example, the view that traditional
armchair epistemology proceeds via judgments about cases as central evidential inputs is
no more plausible than the view that it proceeds via intuitions; the argument of §1 counts
equally against this view. (Someone who does not judge that wishful thinking isn’t a route
to justified belief thereby manifests a rational failure, even absent what is suggested to be
the central evidence.) I conclude that if, as many of us have recently argued, intuitions do
not play evidential roles in traditional philosophical methodology, this fact is relevant for
experimentalist critiques; it cannot straightforwardly be ignored or translated away.16
I say that the denial of evidential roles has relevance. I do not say, with Herman Cappelen,
that it is definitive against experimental philosophy. In §4 I explain why.
4 Relevance of Experimental Philosophy
Herman Cappelen thinks, as I do, that the role of intuitions in philosophical methodology
has been greatly exaggerated. He also thinks, as I do not, that this renders experimental
philosophy irrelevant:
The Big Objection to experimental philosophy is easy to state and should be
obvious: philosophers don’t rely on intuitions about thought experiments, so
16Ichikawa (2014a) also contains arguments to this eﬀect.
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studies of intuitions people have about thought experiments have no direct rel-
evance for philosophical arguments or theorizing. . . . Negative experimental
philosophy attacks a practice that doesn’t exist. Positive experimental philoso-
phers attempt to support a practice that doesn’t exist. In short: If philosophers
don’t rely on intuitions, then the project of checking people’s intuitions is philo-
sophically pointless. Cappelen (2012, pp. 221–2)
Although I do think, as I suggested in §2, that some experimental philosophy is subject
to this criticism, I think that Cappelen goes too far. Not all experimental philosophy is
irredeemably based in a misconception about the role of intuitions in traditional philosoph-
ical methods. Not even all of the restrictionist critique relies on such misconceptions. It
is consistent with the claim that intuitions do not play evidential roles in philosophical
methodology that the empirical investigation of intuitions may be relevant for philosophical
methodology—even that in theory, they may show deep problems with it. In the abstract,
this should be relatively easy to see; there’s no contradiction in the idea that a method
doesn’t make central evidential use of X, but that the study of X may nevertheless be
methodologically important for that practice; evidential roles aren’t the only roles of epis-
temic significance. For example, I don’t think that judgments about gender play evidential
roles in hiring decisions regarding university biology laboratory manager positions; biology
professors base such hiring decisions on scientific qualifications. The gender of the candi-
date isn’t evidence regarding one’s suitability for such a job; moreover, scientists recognize
that gender isn’t evidence regarding one’s suitability for such a job. (A careful study of the
discussions biologists have in their hiring decisions similar to the case studies in Cappelen
(2012), I’d conjecture, would not yield evidence of reliance on gender.) None of this is any
reason to ignore Corinne Moss-Racusin’s (2012), which finds evidence that scientists display
systematic subconscious bias against women. Even setting aside the moral and social jus-
tice issues here, Moss-Racusin’s findings, if true, demonstrate a significant epistemic source
of bias—empirical methods have demonstrated a respect in which scientists’ beliefs about
who would make good laboratory managers go systematically awry. It would be a mistake
for a scientist to ignore this critique on the grounds that gender does not play evidential
roles in scientific hiring—not because it does, but because evidential roles aren’t the only
things that matter. One has epistemic reason to consider sources of epistemic defeat, even
independently of considerations about what is and isn’t evidence.
Some experimentalist critiques of traditional philosophical methods seem naturally inter-
pretable along just these kids of lines. When Stacey Swain et. al (2008) demonstrate that
epistemic intuitions are subject to an order eﬀect, this is of epistemic significance to philoso-
phers who are making epistemic judgments—not because the intuitions, or the judgments
themselves, or indeed anything psychological, are the evidence they’re relying upon—but
because these empirical findings constitute a possible reason to doubt one’s own ability to
respond rationally to the available evidence. Recall the case of Bullwinkle and the chess
board. After his blindfold slips, he has all the evidence necessary to know that Natasha can
win this turn, but he doesn’t know it. Suppose he believes it anyway; although he can’t see
what the winning move would be, he just has a feeling that this looks like a board where
white is in a position to win. The fact that Bullwinkle isn’t very good at chess is the sort
of thing that ought to give him reason to doubt his judgment—this, even though he does
not rely on any claim about his chess skill as evidence. In the same way, order eﬀects in
intuitions about philosophical thought experiments are epistemically significant, regardless
of whether one is using intuitions in evidential roles. If I learn through empirical means that
I tend to be influenced in my judgments by irrelevant factors, this gives me good reason to
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take extra care that I’m not going wrong.17 Similarly, when Horowitz (1998) argues that
certain controversial deontological moral intuitions are the result of a systematic tendency
to overestimate the value of what one thinks of oneself as already having, this kind of psy-
chological data can be relevant for deciding which arguments to accept. Such, of course, is
continuous with the traditional armchair project of explaining away intuitions.18
Cappelen recognises a version of the experimentalist critique along these lines. In Cap-
pelen (2014), he presents this fictionalised bit of dialogue between himself and a defender
of experimental philosophy:
X-P: So is your view that we should not care about or try to find biases in
philosophical practice? We should just ignore them? Isn’t that an irresponsible
intellectual attitude?
HC: That’s not my view. There are lots of biases in philosophy. Where you an I
diﬀer is on how to discover and evaluate those. I think we discover those by doing
philosophy—by finding assumptions and presuppositions that bias philosophical
reflection. Construed in that way, I see myself as spending a great deal of my
time as a philosopher discovering philosophical biases. The discussion at the
core of this paper is a good illustration: I think much metaphilosophy is biased
in favour of the view that philosophical practice is intuition-based. That bias has
distorted metaphilosophical reflections. But discovering that bias, and justifying
opposition to it, doesn’t involve surveys. It is about doing philosophy like we
were trained to do it: it involves thinking hard about arguments, uncovering
hidden assumptions and then questioning them. (p. 284)
But one needn’t—and, in my view, shouldn’t—think of the most plausible versions of
the experimentalist critique as in tension with Cappelen’s self-attribution here. Cappelen
here admits that philosophical biases are epistemically relevant, and that it is worthwhile
for philosophers to expend energy in the attempt to detect them; the contrast he draws is
between the idea that one should investigate them with surveys, or by ‘doing philosophy
like we were trained to do it’. If what I have said in this section is right, then this is
a false dichotomy (and not just because some philosophers were trained to do philosophy
with surveys!). We should think of the experimentalists’ surveys, in at least some instances,
as a part of ‘philosophy like we were trained to do it’. It is, I think, incumbent upon a
defender of a restrictionist challenge to explain why her data casts doubt on traditional
methods—and I agree with Cappelen that too often, the proﬀered explanations make unre-
alistic assumptions about the role of intuitions in those traditional methods—but this isn’t
always so. As I suggested in Ichikawa (2014a), I think that experimental philosophy tends to
be perceived, by many of its practitioners and most of its critics, as a radical departure from
standard methods; once we dispense with the assumption of anything like ‘intuition-driven
romanticism’ as a descriptive thesis of traditional methods, we should should consider that
perception an error. And the arguments of Cappelen and of Williamson are, I think, very
17It is of course controversial whether experiments like those of Swain et al. (2008) do give professional
philosophers reason to doubt themselves—for example, one might think that philosophers are suﬃciently
diﬀerent from the folk who are the targets of these studies. I suspect that in many cases, responses like this
on behalf of traditional methods may be defensible. (In Ichikawa (2011) I argue that traditional methods are
generally able to meet the experimentalist critiques.) But this is to engage directly with the experimentalist
critics; my claim here is that in such cases, this is what is necessary. We cannot sidestep them by denying
an evidential role for intuitions.
18See Ichikawa (2009) for further discussion of this point.
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helpful in showing why that is an error. But most sensitive experimental philosophers today
who are expressing concerns about traditional methodology are more careful to express their
concerns in ways that do not call for such a radical departure from traditional methods; it is
instead a call for a more systematic and scientific treatment of the psychological questions
concerning philosophers’ biases. Perhaps traditional methods have the resources to satisfy
that call;19 but it is not one it is legitimate wholly to ignore.20
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